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Abstract 
Romania belongs to the group of the new EU members that are committed by the 
Treaty to adopt the euro, which implies that they must strive to fulfill all the nominal 
convergence criteria. Analyzing the Greece’s monetary experience towards the EMU and its 
available policy instruments for this goal, this paper tries to derive some challenging lessons 
for Romania on its path to euro adoption. The present Greek debt crisis and the background 
of the global financial crisis are also taken into consideration. The Greek situation shows 
that an overly ambitious timetable and effort for adopting the single currency can be rather 
costly for the country concerned and the endeavor to improve the performance of the 
economy must be a permanent process and not be limited to satisfying the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Greek road to euro adoption and then to the current debt crisis provide 
some lessons for Romania as a new EU member searching the right setting of 
priorities in achieving the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria. 
Greece acceded to the EU in 1981 but, for economic reasons, could not 
introduce the euro until 2001. This paper analyzes the Greek monetary path to EMU 
and the available policy instruments for this goal. On the basis of the Greek 
experience and against the background of Romania’s commitment to join the euro 
area in 2014 or 2015, we try to shed light on the current debate about the optimal 
path for participation in the ERM and the adoption of the euro by a new EU 
member. The context of the global financial crisis is also taken into account. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three distinct 
periods (1981-1992; 1992-1994 and 1995-2001) of the convergence efforts of 
Greece – the first EU country joining the euro area after the first wave of the eleven 
founding members. Section 3 presents briefly the main features of the present Greek 
debt crisis. Section 4 analyzes the Romanian path on the way towards euro adoption, 
with regard to developments in prices, fiscal balances and debt ratios, exchange rates 
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and long-term interest rates, together with other relevant factors. The last section 
provides the concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Greek road to the euro 
 
We will describe first the monetary path to EMU of Greece to the euro 
area2. Greece acceded to the EU in 1981 but, for economic reasons, could not 
introduce the euro until 2001.  
 
The period 1981-1992 
 
The main feature of the Greek economy in the interval 1981-1992 was 
stagflation, with an inflation rate of around 20% and a real growth rate of only 1.5%.  
While disinflationary monetary policies began in most industrial countries in the 
early 1980s, in Greece the ability to use monetary policy to reduce inflation was 
curtailed by the obligation to finance large fiscal deficits with money-creation The 
general government deficit-to-GDP ration jumped from around 2.5% in 1981 to 
around 8.5% in 1982 and attained about 11% in the next decade. Powerful 
incentives for money creation were provided by the influential role of the 
government in setting the objectives of the monetary policy combined with an 
underdeveloped tax system. Monetary and credit aggregates reached thus double-
digit growth rates, while real interest rates ex post were negative until 1987. Table 1 
presents selected economic indicators for Greece in the period 1981-2001. 
In the first half of the 1980s, Greece registered an increase in the current-
account deficit and a build-up of external debt, resulting in devaluations of the 
drachma (GRD) in 1983 and 1985. The competitiveness of the economy and the 
growth of potential output were undermined by long-standing structural weaknesses 
such as high concentration of industrial activity in declining traditional industries 
and the pervasiveness of rigidities and controls in labor and product markets and the 
financial system. EU membership from January 1981 meant that Greece had to 
compete with other European economies that were more advanced and more 
efficient. The potential benefits from EU accession were limited by the large 
domestic and external imbalances. The unemployment rate witnessed a rise from 
about 4% in 1981 to almost 10% in 1991. 
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Table 1: Selected macroeconomic indicators of Greece: 1981-2001 
 1981 1992 Change 
1981-1992 
1998
(t-3)1 
1999 
(t-2) 
2000 
(t-1) 
GDP per capita2 74 67 -6.8 67 68 68 
Real GDP Growth (%) -1.6 0.7 12.93 3.4 3.6 4.2 
Labour Productivity 
Growth (%) 
-7.1 -0.9 9.43 -0.9 4.0 4.9 
General Gov. Bal. (% of 
GDP) 
-8.7 -12.6 128.44 -2.5 -1.9 -1.8 
Public Debt level (% of 
GDP) 
27.0 87.8 60.85 105.8 105.1 106.2 
Inflation rate (CPI) (%) 24.5 15.9 18.26 4.8 2.6 3.2 
Exchange Rate: (Nat. 
currency per DEM) 
25.56 132.96 -80.77 168.85 N/A N/A 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
1t represents the year of euro adoption: 2001. 
2 As a percentage of the EU average (definition of EU at that time). 
3 The change for real GDP, labor productivity and the inflation rate is calculated as the cumulative 
change given by: (Value 1992/Value 1981) - 1.  
4 Cumulative general government deficit 1981-1992. 
5 Cumulative increase 1981-1992. 
6 Average inflation rate between 1981 and 1992. 
7 Cumulative depreciation 1981-1992. 
 
The period 1992-1994 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, EU countries were struck by a number of 
negative shocks. Economic growth decreased significantly, leading to a recession in 
1993. The absence of realignments in the EMS in the 5 years after 1987 tended to 
aggravate the economic slowdown of the early 1990. In the absence of nominal 
exchange rate changes, there was an increased need of domestic adjustment, which 
was not adequate in many EU countries. This circumstance, combined with market 
concerns about the future economic policies, led to speculative attacks against EMS 
currencies and forced the suspension of the pound sterling (GBP) and the Italian lira 
(LIT) from the ERM in September 1992. This determined the widening of the ERM 
exchange rate band from +/-2¼ percent to +/- 15 percent in August 1993. 
The early 1990s were characterized by large macroeconomic imbalances in 
Greece. In 1991 inflation was about 20%, the fiscal-deficit-to-GDP ratio reached 
16%. The current-account deficit exceeded 8% of GDP, and real interest rates 
approached zero. In response to the macroeconomic imbalances, incomes policy was 
tightened and wage-indexation system was eliminated, leading to a decrease in 
weekly earnings in manufacturing in the interval 1992-1994. 
The tightened incomes policy, the appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
the weak economic growth led to a fall in inflation to low double-digit rates. 
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As we have already mentioned, in the early 1980 the financial system was 
highly regulated and monetary policy operated through direct instruments of 
monetary control. By the mid 1980s, a series of deregulation measures allowed the 
financial markets to begin to function more efficiently, permitting the gradual 
adoption, in the 1990s, of indirect instruments of monetary control. Financial 
liberalization, however, had to be a gradual process, for avoiding potentially-
destabilizing effects in the economy.  
Financial reform initially involved raising interest rates on deposits, loans, 
and government securities to market-clearing levels. This step was followed by the 
abolition of interest-rate ceilings and the elimination of quantitative restrictions on 
credit allocation. Financial liberalization was accompanied by the lifting of foreign-
exchange controls, with the last vestige of capital controls removed in May 1994. 
Essentially, by 1995 financial deregulation was completed. 
 
Convergence to EMU: 1995-2001 
 
By 1994 Greece’s performance in achieving the nominal convergence 
criteria was weak. In 1994 the inflation was more than double the rates experienced 
in such formerly-high-inflation EU countries as Italy, Portugal and Spain, and the 
fiscal deficit was considerably higher in Greece than in any of those countries. If 
EMU was to be a realistic medium-term commitment, a regime change was 
necessary. This change came in 1995. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
and the government’s publicly-stated objective of joining the euro area provided 
powerful incentives for mobilizing broad public support for policy adjustment.  
The Bank of Greece adopted in 1995 a “hard-drachma policy”3 under which 
the exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor (Tavlas, 2000). For the first time, 
the Bank announced a specific exchange-rate target. Underlying this policy was the 
belief that the adoption of a visible anchor could enhance the credibility of the 
Bank’s disinflation effort. By pegging the exchange rate at an appropriate level, 
inflation could be brought down rapidly because of (1) the stabilization of prices in 
the traded-goods sector, (2) the attendant restraint imposed on wage-setting and 
price-setting behavior, and (3) the restraint imposed on government spending. 
During the first three years of the hard-drachma policy, inflation was more 
than halved (from over 10% in 1995 to under 5% by the end of 1997). Although 
inflation fell sharply, real growth accelerated: real GDP growth averaged about 
2.8% during 1995-1997 compared with 1.0% during 1992-1994. 
Why did real growth accelerate during a period when inflation fell from a 
moderate level to single digits? Of course the credibility is difficult to be quantified, 
but the hard drachma policy provided an unambiguous target for monetary policy, 
exerting a measure of self-discipline and serving to tie down inflation expectations. 
Credibility was also strengthened by:  
                                                
3 The “hard drachma policy” was an application of the Barro-Gordon (1983) model to 
an open economy. 
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The substantial fiscal adjustment; relative to GDP, the fiscal deficit fell from 
about 10% in 1995 to around 4% in 1997. Measures to increase the efficiency of tax 
collection were stepped up so that seignorage became a less-significant source of 
revenue; 
With the complete deregulation of the financial system by 1995, the Bank of 
Greece was increasingly able to use interventions that were flexible and reduced the 
operational costs of monitoring and controlling incurred by the Bank of other 
financial institutions; 
The Greek Parliament approved central-bank independence and provided 
the Bank of Greece with a mandate to achieve price stability. 
However, as it is typically the case with nominal anchor exchange-rate pegs, 
which are a double-edged sword, this regime entailed difficulties. During the 
transition to low inflation, the anchor generated an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate that reduced competitiveness, contributing to a widening current-account 
deficit. A devaluation of the GRD followed. The shift was provided by the ERM. On 
March 16, 1998, the GRD joined the ERM at a central rate that implied a 12.3% 
devaluation against the ECU (central rate: ECU 1 = GRD 353.109), as illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
\ 
March 16, 1998: Central rate: ECU/EUR 1 = GRD 353.109January 17, 2000: New CR = GRD 340.75 
= Conversion rate 
Source: National Bank of Greece 
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But unlike other devaluations of the 1990s, this one was not accompanied 
by speculative attacks or by a financial crisis or a contraction in the economic 
activity.  
GRD registered a successful exit from one pegged rate to another due to the 
following circumstances: 
Fiscal tightening continued following the devaluation. The fiscal deficit, 
relative to GDP, fell to about 1% in 1999, from 4% in 1997. Labor market policy 
gradually adjusted to the necessity of fiscal discipline, which enhanced international 
competitiveness. 
Prudential regulation and supervision of the banking system were strictly 
enforced so that there was no net foreign exposure of the banking system. 
The ERM provided another important advantage. Entry at the standard 
fluctuation bands of +/-15% provided the Bank ample room for maneuver. Thus, 
when capital inflows resumed following ERM entry, the Bank allowed the exchange 
rate to appreciate relative to its central rate, helping to maintain its tight monetary-
policy stance and to contain the inflationary impact of the devaluation. 
As a result of the tightened and consistent policy mix, inflation reached a 
low of 2% annual rate during the second half of 1999. Then, in order to limit the 
degree of depreciation that would be required for the market rate of the GRD to 
reach its central rate and the resulting inflationary pressures, the central rate was 
revalued by 3.5% in January 2000 (new central rate: EUR 1 = GRD 340.75). All the 
Maastricht criteria were thus fulfilled, allowing Greece to become the 12th member 
of the euro zone on January 1, 2001. 
 
2.1. The present debt Greek crisis 
 
Over the past ten years, Greece borrowed heavily in international capital 
markets to fund government budget and current account deficits. The reliance on 
financing from international capital markets left Greece highly vulnerable to shifts 
in investor confidence. Investors became worried in October 2009, when the newly 
elected Greek government revised the estimate of the government budget deficit for 
2009 from 6.7% of GDP to 12.7% of GDP. In April 2010, Eurostat estimated 
Greece’s deficit to be even higher, at 13.6% of GDP. Investors feared then Greece’s 
ability to repay its maturing debt obligations, estimated at €54 billion ($72.1 billion) 
for 2010. On April 23, 2010, the Greek government requested financial assistance 
from other European countries and the International Monetary Fund to help cover its 
maturing debt obligations. 
The debt crisis has both domestic and international causes (Nelson, Belkin, 
and Mix, 2010). Domestically, analysts point to high government spending, weak 
revenue collection, and structural rigidities in Greece’s economy. Internationally, 
observers argue that Greece’s access to capital at low interest rates after adopting the 
euro and weak enforcement of EU rules concerning debt and deficit ceilings 
facilitated Greece’s ability to accumulate high levels of external debt.  
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Years of unrestrained spending, cheap lending and failure to implement 
financial reforms left Greece badly exposed when the global economic downturn 
struck. This whisked away a curtain of partly fiddled statistics to reveal debt levels 
and deficits that exceeded limits set by the eurozone. 
National debt, put at €300 billion ($413.6 billion), is bigger than the 
country's economy, with some estimates predicting it will reach 120 percent of gross 
domestic product in 2010.  
Greece's credit rating (the assessment of its ability to repay its debts) has 
been downgraded to the lowest in the eurozone, meaning it will likely be viewed as 
a financial black hole by foreign investors. This leaves the country struggling to pay 
its bills as interest rates on existing debts rise. The Greek government must 
implement harsh and unpopular spending cuts. 
 
3. Romania’s accomplishment of the nominal convergence criteria 
 
Romania belongs to the group of the new EU members (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania) that are 
committed by the Treaty to adopt the euro, which implies that they must strive to 
fulfill all the convergence criteria. 
On the basis of the ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 (ECB 2010), we 
analyze in this section the Romanian path on the way of Euro adoption, with regard 
to developments in prices, fiscal balances and debt ratios, exchange rates and long-
term interest rates, together with other relevant factors. 
 
Rate of inflation 
Over the reference period from April 2009 to March 2010, the 12-month 
average rate of HICP inflation in Romania was 5.0%, i.e. considerably above the 
reference value of 1.0% for the criterion on price stability (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: HICP inflation in Romania (annual percentage changes) 
 2009 Dec. 2009 Jan. 2009 Feb. 2010 Mar. Apr. 2009 
To Mar. 
2010 
HICP inflation 4.7 5.2 4.5 4.2 5.0 
Reference value1 1.0 
Euro area2 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.4 0.3 
1) The basis of the calculation for the period April 2009-March 2010 is the unweighted arithmetic 
average of the annual percentage changes in the HICP for Portugal, Estonia and Belgium plus 1.5 
percentage points. 
2) The euro area is included for information only. 
Source: European Commission (Eurostat). 
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Looking back over a longer period, consumer price inflation in Romania has 
followed a clear downward trend (see Figure 2), but has nevertheless remained high 
at around 5.6% on average in 2009.  
 
Figure 2: Price developments in Romania 
 
Source: European Commission (Eurostat) 
 
 
Inflation dynamics over the past ten years should be viewed against the 
background of robust GDP growth until mid-2008, followed by a sharp contraction 
in economic activity. Wage growth outpaced productivity growth, which in turn 
boosted unit labour cost growth and overheating pressures, leading to an erosion of 
competitiveness. In the course of 2008, however, the trend in HICP inflation 
reversed, mainly owing to the decline in energy and food prices, followed by a 
strong contraction in economic activity from the end of 2008. Looking at recent 
developments, HICP inflation picked up at the end of 2009, reaching 5.2% in 
January 2010, before falling to 4.2% in March 2010. This temporary rise was mainly 
attributable to increases in excise duties on tobacco. Notwithstanding the significant 
decline in economic activity, inflation has been particularly persistent, reflecting 
major rigidities in the product and labour markets and strong but slowing unit labour 
cost growth. 
The latest available inflation forecasts from major international institutions 
range from 4.0% to 4.4% for 2010 and 3.0% to 3.5% for 2011. The main upside 
risks to this outlook relate to the dynamics of commodity and administered prices. 
On the downside, the decline in domestic price pressures could be larger or more 
protracted than currently envisaged if economic activity recovers more slowly than 
expected at present. Looking further ahead, the catching-up process is likely to have 
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a bearing on inflation, and/or on the nominal exchange rate over the coming years, 
given that GDP per capita and price levels are still significantly lower in Romania 
than in the euro area (see Table 3). However, it is difficult to assess the exact size of 
the effect resulting from this catching-up process. 
 
Table 3: Measures of inflation and related indicators 
T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal deficit and government debt 
 
Romania is at present subject to an EU Council decision on the existence of 
an excessive deficit. In the reference year 2009 the general government budget 
showed a deficit of 8.3% of GDP, i.e. significantly above the 3% reference value.  
The general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio was 23.7%, i.e. far below 
the 60% reference value (see Table 4).  
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Table 4: General government position (as a percentage of GDP) 
 2008 2009 20101 
General government 
surplus (+)/deficit(-) 
-5.4 -8.3 -8.0 
Reference value -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 
Surplus/deficit, net of 
government investment 
expenditure2 
0.1 -2.9 -2.6 
General government 
gross debt 
13.3 23.7 30.5 
Reference value 60.0 60.0 60.0 
Source: European Commission (Eurostat) 
 
In 2010 the deficit ratio is forecast by the European Commission to decline 
to 8.0% and the government debt ratio is projected to increase to 30.5%. With regard 
to other fiscal factors, the deficit ratio exceeded the ratio of public investment to 
GDP in 2009 and is expected to do so also in 2010.  
Moving on to examine trends in other fiscal indicators, Figure 3 and Table 5 
show that the general government total expenditure-to-GDP ratio increased from 
38.5% in 2000 to 40.4% in 2009.  
 
Table 5: General government budgetary position 
 
Sources: ESCB and European Commission (Eurostat). 
Notes: Differences between totals and the sum of their components are due to rounding. Interest 
payable as reported under the excessive deficit procedure. The item "impact of swaps and FRAs" is 
equal to the difference between the interest (or deficit/surplus) as defined in the excessive deficit 
procedure and in the ESA 95. See Regulation (EC) No 2558/2001 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the reclassification of settlements under swap arrangements and under forward rate 
agreements. 
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Figure 3: General government expenditure and revenue (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
 
 
During the period under consideration, and particularly in 2008-2009, 
“compensation of employees” and “social benefits” increased their share in GDP. 
Capital spending also increased as a ratio to GDP, especially following an 
acceleration of infrastructure projects in 2006 and 2007. Total government revenue 
as a share of GDP remained broadly stable between 2000 and 2007 at around 33% 
of GDP, despite the significant reduction in taxation introduced in 2005 under the 
flat tax reform. The total revenue-to-GDP ratio started to decline towards the end of 
2008 and particularly in 2009 following the global financial crisis, when it reached 
32.1% of GDP. 
As regards the sustainability of its public finances, according to the 
European Commission’s 2009 Sustainability Report, Romania appears to be at high 
risk. Further fiscal consolidation is required for Romania to comply with the 
medium-term budgetary objective specified in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Looking ahead, Romania’s medium term fiscal policy strategy envisages a 
gradual reduction in the deficit-to-GDP ration in 2011 (to 4.4% of GDP) in order to 
bring it to the 3% reference value in 2012.  
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 Exchange rate 
 
Over the two-year reference period, the Romanian leu did not participate in 
ERM II, but traded under a flexible exchange rate regime. The leu depreciated 
strongly against the euro between mid-2008 and early 2009 before recovering 
slightly thereafter. The international financial assistance programme led by the EU 
and the IMF helped in late March 2009 to ease the downward pressure on the 
Romanian currency.  
Until April 2009 the exchange rate of the Romanian leu against the euro 
showed a high degree of volatility, as measured by annualized standard deviations of 
daily percentage changes. Thereafter, in the context of gradual normalization of 
global financial market conditions, volatility decreased, although it still remained at 
relatively high levels. Short-term interest rate differentials against the three-month 
EURIBOR remained on average at a high level of around 9.1 percentage points for 
the entire reference period, on account of both the inflation differential vis-à-vis the 
euro and the unfavourable outlook for Romania’s economy, as reflected in a 
downgrade of the Romanian sovereign credit rating by rating agencies and the 
global financial crisis. The spread stood at 6.5 percentage points in the three-month 
period ending March 2010. 
In March 2010 the real exchange rate of the Romanian leu was somewhat 
above its ten-year historical averages, both bilaterally against the euro and in 
effective terms (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Romanian leu: real exchange rate developments 
(monthly data; percentage deviation in March 2010 from ten-year average calculated 
for the period April 2000-March 2010) 
 
 
As regards other external developments, Romania reported a progressive 
increase in the deficit in the combined current and capital account of its balance of 
payments, from 3.1% of GDP in 2002 to very high levels of 12.8% in 2007. 
Following a strong fall in domestic demand, which led to lower imports, the current 
and capital account deficit of 11.1% of GDP in 2008 decreased sharply to 4.0% in 
2009. The country’s net international investment position deteriorated significantly 
from -26.9% of GDP in 2000 to -61.9% in 2009. 
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Long term interest rate 
 
Long-term interest rates were 9.4% on average over the reference period 
from April 2009 to March 2010 and thus well above the 6% reference value for the 
interest rate convergence criterion (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7: Long-term interest rates (LTISs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From late 2005, despite significantly decreasing inflation, Romanian long-
term interest rates increased until the end of 2006 (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Long-term interest rate (LTIR) (monthly averages in percentages) 
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In general, in recent years, long-term interest rates in Romania have 
increased sharply in an environment of high levels of risk aversion among investors 
and uncertainties regarding the economic outlook. More recently they started on a 
downward trend, but remain at relatively elevated levels, with the long-term interest 
rate on government bonds in Romania reaching 7.1% in March 2010. Developments 
in Romanian long-term interest rates should be interpreted with caution, however, as 
the market for Romanian government bonds is rather illiquid and is characterized by 
a limited number of transactions. 
The Romanian capital market is much smaller than that of the euro area and 
remains underdeveloped (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Selected indicators of financial development and integration 
(as a percentage of GDP, unless otherwise stated) 
 
  
By international standards, the corporate bond market is still at an early 
stage in terms of volume of issuance: the amount of debt securities issued by 
corporations reached just 0.2% of GDP at the end of 2009. Bucharest Stock 
Exchange capitalization declined sharply in 2008 and the beginning of 2009 and 
reached 10.3% of GDP in December 2009. 
In the light of its assessment on legal compatibility and on the fulfilment of 
the convergence criteria, and taking into account the additional factors, the European 
Commission (2010) considered that Romania does not fulfil the conditions for the 
adoption of the euro. 
Achieving an environment conducive to sustainable convergence in 
Romania requires, inter alia, stability-oriented monetary policy and the strict 
implementation of the fiscal consolidation plans. In addition, Romania needs to deal 
with a wide range of economic policy challenges. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The Greek experience helps to shed light on the debate about the optimal 
path for participation in the ERM and the adoption of the euro by the new EU 
members, including Romania. 
The convergence effort of Greece is of particular importance because it was 
the first successful attempt by a member state to join the euro area after the first 
wave of the eleven founding members. Such a single effort involved increased 
difficulties to manage the convergence operation, both because the “distance” 
Greece had to cover in order to comply with the convergence criteria was 
significantly greater than was the case for most of the other member states but, also, 
because in the case of the eleven member states of the first wave the risks involved 
in their convergence operation were “pooled” within the joint effort (Papaspyrou, 
2004). 
At the same time, taking into account the present debt crisis, the Greek 
experience shows that an overly ambitious timetable and effort for adopting the euro 
can be rather costly for the country concerned. Troubles encountered at present in 
Greece could lead EU newcomers, as Romania, to reassess the costs and benefits of 
euro adoption (Stokes and Vukotic, 2010). Greek fiscal woes highlight the fact that 
joining the eurozone does not automatically protect against crisis and could even 
leave EU newcomers vulnerable since it takes away policymakers’ ability to carry 
out price adjustments via exchange rate movements.  
It seems that in certain cases, a delay of entry into ERM II would be to the 
benefit of both the country concerned – by allowing a higher degree of freedom in 
setting policy priorities – while also preserving the credibility of the ERM II. 
The available evidence from the fiscal imbalances and public debt in Greece 
suggest also that the effort to improve the performance of the economy and its 
competitiveness must be a permanent process and not be limited to satisfying the 
Maastricht convergence criteria. 
The global financial and economic crisis might delay the euro adoption in 
Romania, because the nominal convergence criteria accomplishment lost their pace. 
Enlargement of the eurozone is likely to be put on the back burner. Moreover, the 
Greek evolutions are contributing to a case of euro enlargement anxiety among 
policymakers, who will probably put Romania and the other new members under a 
very harsh microscope in the run-up to euro entry. The euro project is thus in the 
midst of its biggest test. 
Greece and Romania appear as two blessed countries, with too many 
common advantages but also an increasing number of common challenges. While 
the Greeks try to wake up from the “bad dream” they lived over the last decades, 
Romanians seem ready to enter into big trouble if they follow all possible mistakes 
that Greeks in the last 30 years. 
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